Privileged Access Workstation (PAW) Architecture: Complete Implementation Guide

Enterprise networks face a fundamental security vulnerability: administrators who manage critical infrastructure from the same workstations they use to browse the web, check email, and run productivity applications. Privileged Access Workstation (PAW) architecture solves this problem by providing dedicated, hardened workstations used exclusively for administrative tasks, implementing Microsoft’s zero trust security principles for privileged access. This guide explains how PAW protects against credential theft, lateral movement, and ransomware attacks by isolating administrative activities from standard endpoint threats.

What is Privileged Access Workstation (PAW)?

A Privileged Access Workstation is a dedicated, hardened Windows device used exclusively for administrative tasks in enterprise environments. Unlike standard workstations that run email clients, web browsers, and productivity applications, a PAW is locked down to execute only approved administrative tools like Remote Server Administration Tools (RSAT), PowerShell, and management consoles for Active Directory architecture, Azure, and cloud services.

PAW implements the clean source principle—administrative credentials and tools only run on devices that meet strict security requirements. Microsoft developed PAW as part of its privileged access strategy, which addresses four critical components: privileged accounts, intermediary systems (jump servers), administrative interfaces (consoles), and the devices administrators use.

A PAW is not merely a hardened laptop. It represents a complete security architecture involving device isolation, network segmentation, application control, and hardware-based security features including TPM 2.0, Secure Boot, Credential Guard, and Hypervisor-Enforced Code Integrity (HVCI). Organizations deploy PAWs alongside their existing infrastructure, requiring administrators to maintain separate devices for administrative tasks and standard productivity work.

The architecture integrates with Microsoft Intune device management, Entra ID (formerly Azure AD), Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, and conditional access policies to enforce security controls automatically. PAW extends beyond Windows administration—it applies to any privileged access scenario including cloud platform management, security operations, and database administration.

The Problem PAW Architecture Solves

Modern cyberattacks specifically target administrative credentials because compromising a single domain administrator account grants attackers complete control over an organization’s infrastructure. When IT administrators use standard workstations for both productivity tasks and administrative work, they expose high-value credentials to credential theft attacks through multiple vectors.

Lateral movement attacks represent the most significant threat. An attacker who gains initial access to a standard user workstation through phishing, malware, or software vulnerabilities can capture administrative credentials stored in memory when an administrator logs into that compromised system. Tools like Mimikatz, Pass-the-Hash, and Pass-the-Ticket techniques extract these credentials even from locked workstations, allowing attackers to escalate privileges and move laterally across the network.

Email and web browsing on administrative workstations create additional attack surfaces. Phishing campaigns targeting IT staff deliver malware designed to steal credentials or establish persistence specifically on administrative devices. When administrators check email or browse vendor websites from the same laptop they use to manage domain controllers, a single successful phishing attack compromises privileged access.

Ransomware and human-operated attacks like NotPetya, WannaCry, and modern ransomware campaigns succeed by compromising administrative credentials. Attackers use stolen domain admin credentials to disable backup systems, deploy ransomware across entire networks, and exfiltrate data before encryption. The 2017 NotPetya attack demonstrated how compromised administrative credentials enabled rapid propagation across global enterprise networks.

Compliance frameworks including NIST SP 800-53, CIS Controls, and UK NCSC guidance require organizations to protect privileged access through dedicated hardened systems. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 specifies controls for least privilege (AC-6), identification and authentication (IA-2), and boundary protection (SC-7) that align directly with PAW architecture requirements.

The core vulnerability is simple: general-purpose workstations have large attack surfaces optimized for productivity rather than security. PAW architecture eliminates this vulnerability by providing dedicated devices with minimal attack surfaces used only for administrative activities.

How PAW Architecture Works

PAW architecture implements multiple layers of security controls that work together to create a trustworthy platform for privileged operations. The foundation starts with hardware root of trust—PAWs require modern processors with TPM 2.0 chips, UEFI firmware, and support for virtualization-based security features. These hardware components enable Secure Boot, which validates that only trusted operating system components load during startup, and Hypervisor-Enforced Code Integrity (HVCI), which prevents kernel-mode malware from executing.

Credential Guard isolates credentials in a virtualized container that even kernel-mode code cannot access. When an administrator logs into a PAW, the system stores authentication secrets in this isolated environment, preventing Pass-the-Hash attacks that target credential material in operating system memory. Device Health Attestation verifies that these security features remain active, providing cryptographic proof that the device boot process has not been compromised.

Network isolation represents the second critical layer. Organizations deploy PAWs on dedicated VLANs or subnets with strict firewall rules that block all outbound traffic except connections to specific administrative endpoints. A typical PAW can reach domain controllers, Azure Portal, Microsoft 365 admin center, and internal management systems, but cannot access general internet sites, file shares, or email servers. This network architecture prevents malware on a PAW from spreading to user systems and blocks command-and-control communications from compromised applications.

Application control through Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker enforces a whitelist approach where only explicitly approved software can execute. PAWs block all standard productivity applications including email clients, web browsers (except Edge in application guard mode for admin portals), Office applications, instant messaging, and media players. Administrators can only run Windows built-in tools, Microsoft-signed administrative utilities, and specific approved third-party management software.

The operational model requires administrators to maintain two devices: a standard workstation for email, document editing, and general productivity tasks, and a PAW exclusively for administrative activities. This separation ensures that credential-stealing malware on productivity systems cannot compromise administrative credentials, and malware targeting user applications cannot execute on PAWs.

PAW architecture integrates with modern identity and access management systems through conditional access policies in Entra ID. Organizations configure policies that require users accessing administrative interfaces to connect from compliant PAW devices. The system validates device compliance status, verifies that required security features are enabled, and confirms phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication before granting access to privileged systems.

PAW Security Levels and Device Profiles

Microsoft defines three device security profiles that organizations apply based on user roles and data sensitivity. Understanding these profiles helps administrators match security controls to actual risk levels without over-restricting lower-privilege users.

Enterprise devices serve the majority of organizational users who need internet access, productivity applications, and collaboration tools but handle non-sensitive data. These systems implement basic security controls including antivirus, disk encryption, and standard updates without imposing significant restrictions on user activities.

Specialized devices support users who handle sensitive information like personally identifiable information (PII), financial data, or intellectual property. Human resources staff processing employee records, finance teams handling accounting data, and executives accessing confidential strategy documents require enhanced monitoring and restricted application installation, but still need full productivity application suites.

Privileged Access Workstations represent the highest security tier, designed exclusively for users who can modify critical infrastructure, access all organizational data, or perform security operations. Domain administrators, Enterprise administrators, Azure Global Administrators, and security operations center (SOC) analysts use PAWs to perform tasks that, if compromised, would provide attackers complete control over organizational systems.

The key differentiator between specialized devices and PAWs is attack surface reduction. Specialized devices harden security controls while maintaining full productivity capabilities. PAWs eliminate productivity capabilities entirely, removing email, web browsing, and document editing to prevent phishing attacks and drive-by malware infections that specifically target administrative users.

Organizations implement these profiles through Group Policy management or Intune configuration profiles that automatically apply security controls based on device group membership. Users receive appropriate devices based on their highest level of access, and the system enforces profile requirements through automated compliance checking.

Real-World Use Cases for PAW

Large enterprises deploy PAWs for infrastructure teams managing on-premises Active Directory, Exchange servers, and Windows Server estates. Domain administrators use PAWs exclusively for tasks like creating user accounts, modifying group policies, managing domain trusts, and performing schema updates. These administrators maintain separate standard workstations for email, documentation, and communication with colleagues.

Cloud service providers and SaaS companies implement PAW architecture for platform operations teams who maintain customer-facing infrastructure. Site reliability engineers use PAWs to access production Kubernetes clusters, database management systems, and cloud provider consoles. The isolation prevents supply chain attacks where compromised developer workstations could provide access to production systems managing thousands of customer environments.

Financial institutions leverage PAWs to meet regulatory requirements for privileged access management. Banking security teams use PAWs to investigate security incidents, manage SIEM systems, and perform forensic analysis. The dedicated devices ensure that incident response activities occur on hardened systems with complete audit trails, satisfying requirements from regulators and external auditors.

Healthcare organizations protecting electronic health records deploy PAWs for system administrators who manage HIPAA-regulated infrastructure. A 500-bed hospital might deploy 25 PAWs for IT admins, database administrators, and security staff who access systems containing patient data. The dedicated devices help satisfy HIPAA Security Rule requirements for workstation security (164.310(c)) and access controls (164.312(a)).

Government agencies implement PAW architecture to protect classified and sensitive systems. Defense contractors and federal civilian agencies use PAWs for administrators managing systems at various classification levels, with network isolation preventing cross-domain data leaks. The architecture aligns with NIST SP 800-53 high-impact baseline requirements for government information systems.

Managed service providers (MSPs) use PAWs to isolate administrative access across multiple customer environments. MSP engineers use separate PAWs for different customer tiers or security classifications, preventing credential compromise in one customer environment from affecting others. This architecture addresses a significant trust concern for organizations outsourcing IT management.

Deploying PAW with Microsoft Intune

Modern PAW deployment leverages Microsoft Intune and Windows Autopilot for automated, scalable provisioning. Organizations purchase laptops directly from OEM partners including Dell, HP, or Lenovo, with hardware IDs pre-registered in Windows Autopilot. When administrators receive new devices and connect to the internet during initial setup, Autopilot automatically enrolls systems into Intune without manual IT intervention.

Intune configuration profiles define PAW security settings and deploy them automatically during enrollment. Administrators create profiles for Credential Guard, Device Guard, BitLocker encryption, Windows Firewall rules, and security baselines. These profiles configure hardware-based security features that require UEFI firmware settings and TPM attestation:

# Enable Device Health Attestation and HVCI
Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" -Name "EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity" -Value 1
Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceGuard" -Name "RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures" -Value 3

# Disable standard user applications
Remove-AppxPackage -AllUsers Microsoft.WindowsMail
Remove-AppxPackage -AllUsers Microsoft.Office.OneNote

# Enable Credential Guard
Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName IsolatedUserMode -NoRestart

Compliance policies enforce minimum security requirements for devices accessing administrative systems. Administrators configure policies requiring TPM 2.0, Secure Boot enabled, disk encryption active, and Defender antivirus definitions updated within the past 24 hours. Devices failing compliance checks cannot access administrative portals through conditional access policy enforcement in Entra ID.

Application deployment through Intune follows least-privilege principles. Organizations create app packages for approved administrative tools including Remote Server Administration Tools, Azure PowerShell modules, cloud provider CLI tools, and vendor-specific management software. Intune deploys these applications automatically to enrolled PAWs while blocking installation of unapproved software through application control policies.

Conditional access policies in Entra ID complete the zero trust security principles implementation. Administrators configure policies requiring that access to Azure Portal, Microsoft 365 admin center, and other administrative interfaces come only from devices marked as compliant PAWs in Intune. These policies also enforce phishing-resistant MFA using FIDO2 security keys or Windows Hello for Business, preventing legacy authentication and SMS-based MFA that attackers can bypass.

Device groups in Intune organize PAWs by administrative tier. Organizations create separate groups for Tier 0 administrators (Domain/Enterprise admins), Tier 1 administrators (server and service admins), and Tier 2 administrators (workstation support staff). Each tier receives appropriate security controls and application allowlists matching their specific job requirements, avoiding unnecessary restrictions on lower-tier administrators.

Network Isolation and Firewall Configuration

Effective PAW network isolation requires dedicated VLANs or subnets completely separated from user workstation networks. Organizations typically deploy PAW networks using RFC 1918 private address space (e.g., 10.1.100.0/24) with Layer 3 routing controlled through next-generation firewalls that inspect all traffic between administrative and user networks.

Core network isolation rules follow a deny-all approach with explicit allow rules for required administrative endpoints. PAWs can initiate connections to domain controllers for authentication, management servers for monitoring, and cloud administrative portals, but all other outbound traffic is blocked:

# Block outbound traffic except to admin endpoints
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Block-All-Outbound" -Direction Outbound -Action Block

# Allow specific admin portals (example: Azure Portal, AD servers)
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Allow-Azure-Portal" -Direction Outbound -RemoteAddress "portal.azure.com" -Action Allow
New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName "Allow-Domain-Controllers" -Direction Outbound -RemoteAddress "10.0.1.10-10.0.1.20" -Action Allow

Organizations implement return traffic restrictions preventing systems in user networks from initiating connections to PAWs. This configuration blocks malware on compromised user workstations from scanning for and attacking administrative systems. Firewall logs capture all denied connection attempts for security monitoring and threat hunting.

DNS security extends network isolation by filtering queries from PAWs. Organizations configure PAW DNS servers to resolve only internal administrative systems and approved cloud services while returning NXDOMAIN for public internet domains. This approach prevents malware from resolving command-and-control server addresses even if application control is bypassed.

Cloud-connected environments require special consideration for Azure and Microsoft 365 administrative access. Organizations implement conditional access policies requiring compliant PAW devices for admin portal access, supplemented by TLS inspection on firewall appliances monitoring HTTPS traffic to cloud management endpoints. Modern firewall platforms can inspect TLS 1.3 traffic through certificate pinning and enterprise certificate authority integration.

Jump servers and privileged access gateways integrate with PAW network isolation by residing on the administrative network segment. Administrators connect from PAWs to jump servers via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) or SSH, then connect onward to managed systems. This architecture centralizes audit logging and session recording while maintaining PAW isolation from production networks.

Split-tunnel VPN configurations enable administrators working remotely to access administrative systems through encrypted tunnels landing directly on PAW network segments. Organizations configure VPN policies that route only administrative traffic through the tunnel while blocking general internet traffic, preventing remote PAWs from bypassing network isolation controls.

Application Control with AppLocker and WDAC

Application control represents the most effective defense against malware on PAWs by preventing execution of unauthorized code. Organizations choose between AppLocker, which provides user-mode application control through Group Policy, and Windows Defender Application Control, which enforces kernel-mode driver signing and user-mode application control through code integrity policies.

AppLocker offers simpler deployment for most PAW environments through path rules, publisher rules, and file hash rules. Organizations create policies allowing execution of Windows system binaries, Microsoft-signed applications, and specific approved administrative tools while blocking everything else:

# Create AppLocker policy allowing only approved admin tools
$AppLockerXml = @"
<AppLockerPolicy Version="1">
  <RuleCollection Type="Exe" EnforcementMode="Enabled">
    <FilePathRule Id="a9e18c21-ff8f-43cf-b9fc-db40eed693ba" Name="Allow System32" UserOrGroupSid="S-1-1-0" Action="Allow">
      <Conditions>
        <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\*"/>
      </Conditions>
    </FilePathRule>
    <FilePublisherRule Id="b9e18c21-ff8f-43cf-b9fc-db40eed693bb" Name="Microsoft Signed" UserOrGroupSid="S-1-1-0" Action="Allow">
      <Conditions>
        <FilePublisherCondition PublisherName="O=Microsoft Corporation*" ProductName="*" BinaryName="*"/>
      </Conditions>
    </FilePublisherRule>
  </RuleCollection>
</AppLockerPolicy>
"@

Set-AppLockerPolicy -XmlPolicy $AppLockerXml

Organizations configure AppLocker enforcement for executable files (.exe, .com), scripts (.ps1, .bat, .vbs), Windows Installer files (.msi, .msp), and packaged apps (AppX). Path rules allow execution from Windows system directories and Program Files, publisher rules permit Microsoft-signed applications, and file hash rules approve specific third-party tools after security review.

WDAC provides stronger security through kernel-mode enforcement and integration with hardware-based security features. Organizations deploy WDAC policies through Group Policy or Intune, defining allowed signers based on publisher certificates, file attributes, and hash values. WDAC prevents rootkits and kernel-mode malware that AppLocker cannot block.

Default-deny policies represent best practice for PAWs, blocking all applications except explicitly approved administrative tools. Organizations maintain a whitelist of approved applications including PowerShell, Remote Desktop Connection, SQL Server Management Studio, VMware vSphere Client, and vendor-specific management consoles. Security teams review and approve new tool requests, adding approved applications to the policy through publisher certificate rules.

Audit mode enables organizations to test application control policies before enforcement. Administrators deploy policies in audit mode, collect blocked application events from Event Viewer, analyze logs to identify legitimate administrative tools requiring allowlist entries, and update policies before switching to enforcement mode. This iterative approach prevents operational disruptions from overly restrictive policies.

Managed installer rules simplify application control by trusting software deployed through approved channels. Organizations configure AppLocker or WDAC to trust applications installed by Intune, Configuration Manager, or specific installer executables. This approach allows IT teams to deploy approved software without creating explicit rules for each application while maintaining protection against user-installed malware.

Troubleshooting and Verification

Validating PAW security configuration requires verifying multiple hardware and software security features. Administrators use PowerShell commands to check that virtualization-based security features are active and device compliance meets policy requirements:

# Check Credential Guard status
Get-ComputerInfo | Select-Object DeviceGuardSecurityServicesRunning

# Verify TPM and Secure Boot
Get-Tpm
Confirm-SecureBootUEFI

# Check device compliance in Intune
Get-MgDeviceManagementManagedDevice -Filter "operatingSystem eq 'Windows'" | Select-Object deviceName, complianceState

Network connectivity issues represent the most common PAW troubleshooting scenario. Administrators experiencing blocked connections to legitimate administrative tools should examine Windows Firewall logs (Event Viewer → Windows Logs → Security) for denied connection events. The Test-NetConnection cmdlet validates connectivity to specific endpoints and identifies whether firewall rules, DNS resolution, or network routing cause connection failures.

Application control blocks preventing execution of approved administrative tools require reviewing AppLocker or WDAC event logs. Administrators check Event Viewer → Application and Services Logs → Microsoft → Windows → AppLocker for block events that identify the executable path, publisher, and rule causing the block. Organizations add exceptions through publisher rules for signed applications or file hash rules for unsigned utilities after security review.

Device compliance failures in Intune typically result from disabled security features or outdated definitions. Administrators verify that TPM is enabled in UEFI/BIOS settings, Secure Boot is active (not just capable), BitLocker encryption is enabled, and Defender antivirus definitions updated recently. Systems failing Device Health Attestation may require firmware updates or TPM clearing and re-initialization.

Credential Guard compatibility issues occur on older hardware lacking required virtualization extensions. Systems must support Intel VT-x or AMD-V virtualization with Second Level Address Translation (SLAT), available on processors from approximately 2010 onward. Administrators verify CPU virtualization support through UEFI/BIOS settings and confirm that Hyper-V is enabled through Windows Features.

Performance problems on PAWs usually indicate resource constraints from virtualization-based security overhead. HVCI and Credential Guard require additional CPU cycles and memory for hypervisor operations. Organizations should provision PAWs with minimum 8GB RAM (16GB recommended), modern multi-core processors, and SSD storage to maintain acceptable performance with security features enabled.

Authentication failures when accessing administrative systems often result from conditional access policy conflicts or MFA issues. Administrators verify that PAW devices are marked as compliant in Intune, check conditional access policy evaluation results in Entra ID sign-in logs, and confirm that phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 or Windows Hello) is properly registered for administrative accounts.

Common Misconceptions About PAW

Many organizations incorrectly assume that jump servers or bastion hosts provide equivalent security to PAWs. While jump servers centralize administrative access and enable session recording, they represent shared infrastructure where multiple administrators authenticate. A compromised jump server exposes credentials for all administrators who connect to it, whereas PAWs provide per-administrator isolation that prevents a single compromised device from affecting other administrators.

The misconception that PAW requires dedicated physical hardware for every administrator leads organizations to reject the architecture as cost-prohibitive. While dedicated physical devices provide maximum security, organizations can implement PAW architecture using Windows Virtual Desktop, Azure Virtual Desktop, or on-premises virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI). Virtual PAWs provide most security benefits at lower cost, though physical PAWs are recommended for highest-privilege Tier 0 administrators managing domain controllers and certificate authorities.

Some organizations believe that Windows security hardening through Group Policy or configuration baselines provides equivalent protection to PAW architecture. Standard workstation hardening reduces attack surface but does not eliminate the fundamental vulnerability of credential exposure when administrators log into productivity systems. Hardened workstations still run email clients, web browsers, and productivity applications that attackers target through phishing and malware campaigns.

IT departments sometimes implement PAW by simply disabling email and browsers on standard workstations without addressing network isolation, application control, and hardware-based security requirements. This incomplete approach provides limited security benefit because administrators often circumvent restrictions through personal devices or find workarounds. Effective PAW implementation requires comprehensive controls across device, network, and account layers enforced through automated policy management.

Organizations occasionally deploy PAWs only for domain administrators while allowing cloud administrators and security operations staff to work from standard systems. This selective deployment leaves significant attack paths open because Azure Global Administrators and security analysts have equivalent or greater access to organizational data than on-premises domain admins. PAW architecture should protect all Tier 0 and Tier 1 administrative roles regardless of whether they manage on-premises or cloud systems.

Related Technologies and Alternatives

Privileged Access Management (PAM) solutions from vendors including CyberArk, BeyondTrust, and Thycotic provide complementary capabilities to PAW architecture. PAM platforms focus on credential vaulting, session isolation, and just-in-time access provisioning, while PAW focuses on endpoint hardening and device isolation. Organizations achieve comprehensive privileged access protection by combining PAW architecture (protecting the devices administrators use) with PAM solutions (protecting the credentials and sessions).

Cloud Workload Protection Platforms (CWPP) extend PAW principles to cloud environments through cloud-native security controls. Organizations use Azure Virtual Desktop with conditional access policies, AWS WorkSpaces with Security Groups, or virtual PAWs running in cloud environments to provide isolated administrative access to cloud infrastructure. These approaches reduce on-premises infrastructure requirements while maintaining zero trust security principles.

Remote Desktop Gateway with network-level authentication and multi-factor authentication provides a lightweight alternative for organizations unable to deploy full PAW architecture. RD Gateway centralizes administrative access through a hardened bastion host with comprehensive logging, though it lacks the per-administrator isolation and hardware-based security of dedicated PAWs.

Secure Admin Workstations (SAWs) represent a vendor-neutral term for the same architectural principles as Microsoft PAW. Organizations implementing Linux administrative systems or managing multi-platform environments use SAW terminology while applying equivalent controls including dedicated devices, network isolation, and application whitelisting to protect privileged access.

Privileged Identity Management (PIM) in Entra ID provides time-bound, approval-based activation of administrative roles. Organizations combine PAW architecture with PIM so that administrators activate privileged roles only when needed and only from compliant PAW devices. This just-in-time approach eliminates standing administrative privileges that present attractive targets for attackers.

Future of Privileged Access Security

Cloud-native PAW implementations through Azure Virtual Desktop and Windows 365 Cloud PC eliminate on-premises infrastructure requirements. Organizations provision virtual PAWs through cloud services with conditional access policies enforcing device compliance, eliminating physical hardware procurement and maintenance. Cloud PAWs enable distributed workforces to access administrative systems securely from any location while maintaining zero trust security controls.

Passwordless authentication using FIDO2 security keys, biometric authentication through Windows Hello for Business, and certificate-based authentication will replace traditional passwords for administrative access. These phishing-resistant authentication methods prevent credential theft attacks that target password-based authentication, even when combined with legacy MFA methods like SMS or authenticator apps.

Artificial intelligence and machine learning enhance PAW security through behavioral analytics and anomaly detection. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint already provides automated threat detection on PAWs, and future capabilities will identify unusual administrative activities, detect lateral movement attempts, and automatically isolate compromised devices before attackers complete their objectives.

Zero-standing privileges through just-in-time access provisioning will become standard for administrative access. Organizations will eliminate permanently assigned administrative rights, instead granting time-bound access activated through automated workflows when administrators need to perform specific tasks. This approach reduces the attack window for credential theft and lateral movement.

Convergence of PAW architecture with Secure Service Edge (SSE) and Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) will simplify network isolation for cloud-connected environments. Modern security platforms combine device posture validation, user authentication, and application-level access control into unified cloud services that replace traditional firewalls and VPNs for administrative access.

Related Articles

Organizations implementing PAW architecture should review these related security topics:

• Identity and Access Management Enterprise Guide — Comprehensive framework for managing user identities and access controls
• Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) — Kernel-level code integrity policies for blocking unauthorized applications
• Zero Trust Security Implementation for Workplaces — Foundational zero trust principles that PAW architecture implements
• Active Directory Architecture Management Guide — Understanding the infrastructure that PAWs protect
• Group Policy Object (GPO) Management Systems — Deploying security policies across Windows environments
• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Setup for Windows — Endpoint detection and response for PAW monitoring
• Windows Security Hardening Guide — Comprehensive Windows security baseline configurations
• Intune MDM Configuration for Windows Devices — Modern device management for PAW deployment